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Abstract
This paper extends Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou (2007) to the case with mul-
tiple prominent firms. All consumers first search among prominent firms, and if
their products are not satisfactory, they continue to search among non-prominent
ones. Prominent firms will charge a lower price than their non-prominent rivals
as in the case with a single prominent firm, but relative to the situation without
any prominent firm, the presence of more than one prominent firm can induce all
firms to raise their prices. We also characterize how market prices and welfare
vary with the number of prominent firms.
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JEL classification: D43, D83, L13
1 Introduction
In many markets, not as most of the search literature assumes, the order in which
consumers search for products is non-random, and it is often influenced by sellers’
marketing activities or framing eﬀects. For example, when using the online search
engine, people might first click through the links displayed on the top of a page; in a
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supermarket or a bookstore, those products displayed at the entrance or other attention-
grabbing positions might get noticed first by consumers; in a restaurant, customers may
also first consider those dishes recommended by the waiter or oﬀered in a special menu.
In all these examples, options are not randomly presented, and some options are more
prominent than others such that they will get considered by consumers prior to others.1
Moreover, lots of evidence shows that prominent options could be favored dispropor-
tionately. For example, Madrian and Shea (2001) identify the default eﬀect in 401(k)
participation and saving behavior. They find that participation is significantly higher
under automatic enrolment and a substantial fraction of participants hired under au-
tomatic enrolment stick to both the default contribution rate and the default fund
allocation. Ho and Imai (2006) and Meredith and Salant (2007) both point out that
ballot order aﬀects election outcomes: being listed first can significantly increase vote
shares. Einav and Yariv (2006) present evidence that economists with surname initials
earlier in the alphabet have more successful professional outcomes.
Sellers in the market also realize the importance of prominence in aﬀecting buyers’
choices, and are willing to pay for their products to be displayed prominently. For
example, internet search engines make money through selling sponsored links, more
prominent adverts are more expensive in yellow page directories, manufacturers pay
supermarkets for access to prominent display positions, and eBay oﬀers sellers the
option to list their products prominently in return for an extra fee.
The above discussion suggests that prominence plays an important role in the mar-
ket, and its impact on market performance deserves investigation. Arbatskaya (2007),
and Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou (2007) (AVZ thereafter) have made progress in this
direction. Arbatskaya considers a search model with homogeneous products in which
consumers only search for price in an exogenously specified order. In equilibrium, the
prices decline with the rank of products. (Otherwise, no consumer would have incen-
tive to sample products in unfavorable positions.) AVZ consider a search model with
horizontally diﬀerentiated products where consumers search both for price and product
fitness. They introduce a prominent firm by supposing that all consumers will visit it
first in their search process. They find that the prominent firm will charge a lower price
1To notice the prominent option first seems to be a natural tendency of people. For example, Lohse
(1997) reports an experiment which shows that, in a yellow page directory, those adverts which are
colorful, with graphics, with larger sizes, or near the beginning of a heading, are much more likely
to catch subjects’ attention. In psychological literature, it is actually well documented that a salient
stimulus can more eﬀectively catch people’s attention, and this reaction, to some degree, is independent
from the economic importance of the stimulus. See, for example, Fiske and Taylor (1991).
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than its prominent rivals, and making one firm prominent will usually increase industry
profit but lower consumer surplus and total welfare.
This paper extends AVZ by allowing for multiple prominent firms. Specifically, all
consumers are assumed to first search among prominent firms randomly, and if their
products are not satisfactory, they continue to search among non-prominent ones. Our
main purpose is to examine how market prices and welfare may vary with the number
of prominent firms. We find that prominent firms still charge a lower price than their
non-prominent rivals, which generalizes the price result in AVZ. However, relative to
the situation without any prominent firm, the presence of more than one prominent
firm can induce all firms to raise their prices. This result will never happen in the case
with a single prominent product where making one product prominent will always lower
its price. We also find that the price of non-prominent products tends to increase with
the number of prominent products, while the price of prominent products may not.
We further show that the relationship between welfare and the number of prominent
products is non-monotonic. This is because the case without any prominent product is
the same as that where all products are prominent. We characterize this relationship
when the search cost is small: industry profit will first increase and then decrease with
the number of prominent products, and it will reach its maximum when about half of
products become prominent; while consumer surplus and total welfare will vary in the
opposite way.2
This paper draws on the rich literature on consumer search in the market. In partic-
ular, our model is related to the branch on search with diﬀerentiated products, which is
initiated by Wolinsky (1986) and developed further by Anderson and Renault (1999).3
Both of them consider random consumer search, while we introduce non-random search
to model the concept of prominence. Except Arbatskaya (2007) and AVZ, an earlier
paper on non-random search and firm competition is Perry and Wigderson (1986). But
their setup is very diﬀerent from ours: it does not allow buyers to go back to previously
visited sellers, and consumers’ valuation of the product is determined before starting
2There are also two technical complications caused by the presence of multiple prominent firms.
First, consumers’ optimal stopping rule is no longer stationary. Specifically, the reservation surplus level
they apply when search among prominent products is diﬀerent from that they apply when search among
non-prominent products. Second, with more than one prominent product, the form of consumers’
stopping rule crucially depends on their expectation of whether prominent products are cheaper or
more expensive than non-prominent products. So we need to deal with the issue of multiple equilibria.
3Weitzman (1979) is an earlier paper which studies the general optimal search among options with
stochastic match values. But there is no supply side in his model.
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searching and so there is no scope for searching for match values as in our model. In
equilibrium, the observed prices could be non-monotonic in the rank order of sellers. As
Arbatskaya (2007), they did not discuss the impact of non-random search on welfare.
Prominence in the market is often related with advertising. In the advertising lit-
erature, there is a small branch on advertising and consumer search order. In Bagwell
and Ramey (1994), though advertising does not directly influence consumers’ search or-
der, it can coordinate their behavior in the following sense: consumers buy immediately
from the firm which advertises most heavily, and due to economies of scale, this firm has
a lower cost and does oﬀer a lower price than its rivals. Thus, the consumer response
to advertising is indeed rational. In our model, the consumer response to prominence
is also rational, but the driving force is very diﬀerent. More recently, and closer in
spirit to our approach, Hann and Moraga-Gonzalez (2007) propose a search model a la
Wolinsky (1986) in which a consumer’s likelihood of sampling a firm is proportional to
that firm’s advertising intensity. They show that, in equilibrium all firms advertise with
the same intensity and set the same price, and consumers end up searching randomly.4
Finally, our work is related to the literature on auctions for being listed prominently
on online search engines. The two papers by Chen and He (2006) and Athey and Ellison
(2007) are especially relevant, since they include in the consumer side a formal model
of the interaction between sponsor links and consumer search.5 In their model, high-
quality sellers will buy top links, and consumers will rationally click through those links
first. Therefore, prominence can signal quality in equilibrium and so improve overall
eﬃciency. Nevertheless, there is no price competition in their models, and so they do
not discuss the impact of prominence on market prices, which, however, is our focus.6
4Wilson (2008) proposes another model with endogenous consumer search order. In his model,
products are homogenous, but before the price competition, each firm can choose the search cost that
consumers must incur to inspect its product. Based on their observation of each product’s search
cost and their expectation of equilibrium prices, consumers choose their optimal search orders. In
equilibrium, firms diﬀerentiate their search costs to avoid intense price competition and consumer
search order is non-random.
5See also Borgers et al. (2007), Edelman et al. (2007), and Varian (2007) for online paid-placement
auctions. But these papers do not have a formal search model in the consumer side.
6Chen and He (2006) do have prices charged by advertisers, but the structure of consumer demand
in their model means that the Diamond Paradox is present, and all firms set monopoly prices.
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2 The Model
Our model generalizes AVZ to allow for more than one prominent product. There are
n ≥ 2 firms, each of them supplying a single product at a constant unit cost which we
normalize to zero.
There are a large number of consumers with measure normalized to one. Each
consumer has a unit demand, and the value of a firm’s product is idiosyncratic to con-
sumers. Specifically, (u1, u2, · · · , un) are the values attached by a consumer to diﬀerent
products, and ui is assumed to be independently drawn from a common distribution
F (u) on [umin, umax] which has a positive and diﬀerentiable density function f(u). We
also assume that all match utilities are realized independently across consumers. The
surplus from buying one unit of firm i’s product at price pi is ui− pi. If all match util-
ities and prices are known, a consumer will choose the product providing the highest
surplus. If ui − pi < 0 for all i, she will leave the market without buying anything.
Initially, however, we assume consumers have imperfect information about the actual
price and match utility of each product, but they can gather information through a
sequential search process: a consumer can find out a product’s price and match utility
by incurring a search cost s > 0, and she can stop searching whenever she wants.
Following the tradition in the search literature, we assume that the sampling process
is without replacement and there is costless recall (i.e., a consumer can return to any
option she has sampled without extra cost).
Although there are no systematic quality diﬀerences among products, some products
are assumed to be more prominent than others. Without loss of generality, let A =
{1, · · · ,m} be the set of prominent products and B = {m+1, · · · , n} be the set of non-
prominent products. The eﬀect of prominence on consumer behavior is reflected through
consumers’ search order: consumers will always sample those prominent products first.7
But no matter among prominent products or among non-prominent ones, consumers
sample products randomly. When A or B is empty, all products are equally prominent
7There are at least three ways to think about our assumption about prominence. First, consumers
may be exposed to options in an exogenously restricted order, and they have no ability to avoid
prominent products. For instance, if a consumer goes to a travel agent to buy airline tickets or a
financial advisor to buy a savings product, the advisor may reveal some options prior to others. Second,
consumers could suﬀer from bounded rationality of some form and be susceptible to manipulation by
marketing ploys. Third, consumers could be fully rational: they choose to visit prominent firms first
because they expect these firms to make the best oﬀers, and this expectation is correct in equilibrium.
Our approach is largely neutral with respect to these three possibilities.
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and our model degenerates to Wolinsky (1986); our model with m = 1 is just the case
considered by AVZ.
Firms maximize their profit, and they simultaneously set prices pi (i = 1, 2, · · · , n)
conditional on the relative prominence between their products and their expectations
of consumer behavior.
3 The Equilibrium
Since all prominent products and all non-prominent products are symmetric, we focus
on the equilibrium where they are charged at pA and pB, respectively. Denote by
∆ = pB − pA the price diﬀerence (if any) between them.
We first consider consumers’ optimal stopping rule. Let a solveZ umax
a
(u− a)dF (u) = s.
Thus, if there is no price diﬀerence among products and if a consumer has found a
product with utility a, she is indiﬀerent between buying this product and sampling
one more product. As long as the search cost is not too high, a exists uniquely and
decreases with s. Throughout this paper, we assume the search cost is relatively small
such that both pA and pB are no greater than a in equilibrium and the search market
is active.8
When m ≥ 2, the optimal stopping rule crucially depends on whether consumers
expect pA < pB or pA > pB. If pA < pB, as we shall show below, the stopping rule is
actually stationary within each product group (but not across groups). Nevertheless, if
pA > pB, the stopping rule in the prominent group is nonstationary. This is because, the
more a consumer approaches to the end of the prominent group, the more attractive the
low price in the non-prominent group is, and so the less willing she is to stop searching.
As a result, when m ≥ 2 we may have multiple equilibria depending on consumers’
expectation of prices. However, as we shall show below, in the uniform-distribution
setting which most of our following analysis will focus on, pA > pB cannot be an
8When consumers expect pA ≤ a, we have
R umax
pA
(u − pA)dF (u) ≥ s, and so they are willing to
participate in the market. When consumers expect pB ≤ a, there also exist some consumers who will
search beyond prominent firms. However, as usual in search models, there are uninteresting equilibria
where consumers expect all firms to set very high prices such that participating in the market is not
worthwhile at all, or consumers expect non-prominent firms to set too high prices such that they will
never search beyond prominent firms. We do not consider these equilibria further.
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equilibrium outcome. Therefore, from now on we focus on consumers’ expectation of
pA ≤ pB. Let
zA ≡ a− pA ≥ zB ≡ a− pB.
They are interpreted as the cutoﬀ reservation surplus levels in group A and B, respec-
tively.
The Optimal Stopping Rule:
Phase 1: In the prominent group A, stop searching if the surplus of the best oﬀering so
far has been no less than zA; otherwise, search on whenever there are prominent
products remained unsampled.
Phase 2: After sampling all prominent products, if the highest available surplus has
been no less than zB, then buy the best prominent product. Otherwise, keep search-
ing in non-prominent group B.
Phase 3: In the group B, stop searching whenever the highest surplus so far has been no
less than zB. Otherwise, search on if there are non-prominent products remained
unsampled.
Phase 4: After searching all products, if the highest surplus is non-negative, then go
back to buy the best product. Otherwise, leave the market without buying anything.
The stopping rule among non-prominent products is standard, and here we explain
the stopping rule among prominent products. Denote by vi the highest net surplus
after sampling i ≤ m products in A. If a consumer comes to the last product in A
and finds out vm < zB, then entering B is always desirable because the benefit from
searching one more product in group B is larger than the unit search cost. (Recall the
definition of a.) If vm ≥ zB, she should not enter B according to her stopping rule in
B. Thus, the consumer should enter group B if and only if vm < zB. Now consider
the situation when the consumer comes to the penultimate product in A. If she finds
out vm−1 < zA, sampling the last product in A is always desirable. Otherwise, she
should stop searching now, because even if she searched on, she would not enter B
since zA ≥ zB. This argument can go backward further and explain the stopping rule
in A.
We now derive demand functions. We claim that a prominent firm’s demand, if it
deviates to a price p while other firms keep charging their equilibrium prices, is
qA(p) = hA · [1− F (a− pA + p)] + rˆA(p) + rA(p), (1)
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where
hA =
1− F (a)m
m (1− F (a))
is the number of consumers who come to this firm for the first time,
rˆA(p) =
Z a
a−∆
F (u)m−1f(u+ p− pA)du
is the number of consumers who return to this firm after sampling all prominent prod-
ucts, and
rA(p) =
Z a
pB
F (u−∆)m−1F (u)n−mf(u+ p− pB)du
is the number of consumers who return after sampling all products.
To understand (1), consider three possible sources of a prominent firm’s demand.
Let i be this firm’s index. (i) A consumer may come to firm i after searching k ≤ m−1
prominent products but without finding a satisfactory one (i.e., all of them have net
surplus less than zA = a − pA). This probability is 1mF (a)k.9 Summing up these
probabilities over k = 0, · · · ,m − 1 leads to hA. For such a consumer, she will buy
at firm i immediately if ui − p ≥ zA, of which the probability is 1 − F (a − pA + p).
This explains the first term in (1). We call this portion of firm i’s demand the “fresh
demand”. (ii) If this consumer finds that all prominent products’ net surplus less than
zA but product i is the best one and has net surplus greater than zB, then she will
return to buy it without searching on among non-prominent firms. (If firm i happens
to be the last firm in group A, she just buys at it immediately.) The probability of this
event is
Pr
µ
max
j 6=i,j∈A
{zB, uj − pA} < ui − p < zA
¶
=
Z p+zA
p+zB
F (u− p+ pA)m−1dF (u),
which is equal to rˆA(p) by changing the integral variable. We call this portion of demand
the “midway returning demand”. (iii) The last possibility is, after sampling all products
(which requires that each product has net surplus less than zB), this consumer goes
back to firm i if its product has the highest positive surplus. The probability of this
9Notice that 1/m is just the probability that this prominent product is on the (k+1)th position in
the consumer’s search process.
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event is
Pr
µ
max
j 6=i,j∈A,l∈B
{0, uj − pA, ul − pB} < ui − p < zB
¶
=
Z p+zB
p
F (u− p+ pA)m−1F (u− p+ pB)n−mdF (u),
which equals rA(p) by changing the integral variable. We call this portion of demand
the “final returning demand”.
Secondly, we claim that a non-prominent firm’s demand, if it deviates to a price p
while other firms stick to their equilibrium prices, is
qB(p) = hB · [1− F (a− pB + p)] + rB(p), (2)
where
hB = F (a−∆)m
1− F (a)n−m
(n−m) (1− F (a))
is the number of consumers who come to this non-prominent firm for the first time, and
rB(p) =
Z a
pB
F (u−∆)mF (u)n−m−1f(u+ p− pB)du
is the number of consumers who return to it after sampling all products.
The explanation goes as follows. Let j be this non-prominent firm’s index. For
a typical consumer, she will come to firm j fresh if she has left all prominent firms
(which requires that each prominent product has net surplus less than zB) and has
sampled k ≤ n−m− 1 non-prominent products in B but has not found a satisfactory
one. This probability is F (a − ∆)m 1n−mF (a)k. Summing up these probabilities over
k = 0, · · · , n−m−1 yields hB. Then she will buy at firm j immediately if uj−p > zB,
of which the probability is 1−F (a− pB + p). This consumer will return to firm j if all
products’ net surplus is less than zB but product j oﬀers the highest positive surplus.
The probability of this event is
Pr
µ
max
l 6=j,i∈A,l∈B
{0, ui − pA, ul − pB} < uj − p < zB
¶
=
Z p+zB
p
F (u− p+ pA)mF (u− p+ pB)n−m−1dF (u),
which is equal to rB(p) by changing the integral variable.
A useful observation is that how a firm’s returning demand varies with its actual
price crucially depends on the density function f . In particular, for the uniform distri-
bution, a firm’s returning demand is independent of its actual price, and so the fresh
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demand is more price responsive than the returning demand. All else equal, a higher
fraction of returning demand makes a firm more want to raise its price.
We now derive equilibrium prices by assuming the uniform valuation distribution
on [0, 1]. (In Appendix A.8, we will extend our main price result to the setting with
more general distributions.) In this case, a is the solution toZ 1
a
(u− a)du = s,
and so a = 1 −
√
2s. Throughout this paper, we keep the following condition which
ensures that equilibrium prices pA and pB are less than a and so an active search market
exists:
0 < s <
1
8
, or
1
2
< a < 1. (3)
According to (1), a prominent firm’s demand, when it charges p, is now
qA(p) = hA · (1− a+ pA − p) + rˆA + rA,
where
hA =
1− am
m (1− a) , rˆA =
Z a
a−∆
um−1du, rA =
Z a
pB
(u−∆)m−1un−mdu.
Notice that both returning demands are independent of the actual price and so less
price sensitive than the fresh demand.10 Profit maximization implies the first-order
condition
hA · (1− a− pA) + rˆA + rA = 0. (4)
According to (2), a non-prominent firm’s demand, when it charges p, is now
qB(p) = hB · (1− a+ pB − p) + rB,
where
hB =
(a−∆)m (1− an−m)
(n−m) (1− a) , rB =
Z a
pB
(u−∆)mun−m−1du.
10If p is too high, then the fresh demand will be zero and the returning demand will depend on p,
which makes the demand function no longer globally concave. However, by using the similar arguments
as in AVZ (footnotes 15 and 18), we can show that the equilibrium derived below will not be overturned
by the global deviation problem.
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The first-order condition is then
hB · (1− a− pB) + rB = 0. (5)
In general, the system of equations (4)—(5) has no analytical solution, but the solu-
tion exists.
Proposition 1 Under condition (3), on the area [0, a]2, (4)—(5) have a unique solution
(pA, pB) ∈ (1− a, 12)2, and pA < pB.
Proof. We prove the existence and uniqueness in Appendix A.1. To show pA < pB,
notice that
∆ = pB − pA =
rB
hB
− rˆA + rA
hA
>
1
hA
(rB − rˆA − rA).
The second equality follows from the first-order conditions (4)—(5), and the inequality
is because in equilibrium hA > hB (i.e., a consumer who comes to a non-prominent firm
must have visited a prominent firm). While
rˆA + rA − rB =
Z a
a−∆
um−1du+
Z a
pB
∆(u−∆)m−1un−m−1du
has the sign of ∆ given pB < a. Therefore, ∆ must be positive.
Due to the consumer search order, each prominent firm’s demand consists of more
fresh demand proportionally than each non-prominent firm, and as we have known,
the fresh demand is more price sensitive than the returning demand in the uniform-
distribution setting.11 Therefore, prominent firms have incentive to charge a lower
price.
Before proceeding, we discuss the issue of multiple equilibria. Our analysis so far is
predicated on consumers’ expectation of pA < pB, and we have confirmed that pA < pB
is indeed an equilibrium outcome. Nevertheless, we have not yet discussed the other
possible equilibrium with pA > pB. The following proposition excludes this possibility
in our uniform-distribution setting. (All omitted proofs are presented in the Appendix.)
11In eﬀect, the result that the fresh demand is more price sensitive then the returning demand will
hold in a more general setting (see Appendix A.8). The intution is as follows. When a firm raises
its price, its fresh demand will decrease for sure since more consumers will then search on. But part
of these consumers will become returning consumers, so raising a firm’s price has a potential positive
eﬀect on its own returning demand.
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Proposition 2 In the uniform-distribution setting, there is no equilibrium in which
prominent products are more expensive than non-prominent products.
Several polar cases also deserve mention: (i) When n→∞, both prices pA and pB
converge to 1−a.12 (ii) It is also straightforward to verify that, when a→ 1 (i.e., when
the search cost tends to zero), both prices converge to the full information price p¯ that
satisfies np¯ = 1 − p¯n. (iii) When a → 1
2
(i.e., when the search cost is suﬃciently high
but restricted by condition (3)), both prices approach to the monopoly price 1
2
since
both of them lie between 1 − a and 1
2
.13 Moreover, in these three polar cases, pA and
pB also tends to the price when there are no prominent firms at all. This means that
prominence has little impact on market prices in these polar cases.
AVZ have shown that making one firm become prominent will induce all non-
prominent firms to raise their price but induce the prominent one to lower its price.
However, we will show below that, when more than one firm is made prominent, all
firms may increase their prices. That is, prominence can be totally anti-competitive.
We first introduce a useful result and define the equilibrium price p0 when there is
no prominent firm. From the first-order conditions (4)—(5), we can see that equilibrium
demands for a prominent product and a non-prominent product are qA = hApA and
qB = hBpB, respectively. Thus, equilibrium total demand is mhApA + (n−m)hBpB.
On the other hand, since the number of consumers who eventually leave the market
without buying anything is pmAp
n−m
B , total demand should be also equal to 1− pmApn−mB .
Therefore, in equilibrium the following equality must hold:
1− am
1− a pA +
1− an−m
1− a (a−∆)
mpB = 1− pmApn−mB . (6)
We can then define p0 as the solution to
1− an
1− a =
1− pn0
p0
(7)
by letting m = n and pA = pB = p0 in (6).
12From (5), we have pB = 1− a+ rBhB . Notice that
rB
hB
<
R a
pB
¡u
a
¢n−m−1 du, and the right-hand side
tends to zero as n → ∞. Thus, pB tends to 1 − a. Since 1 − a < pA < pB, we also have pA tends to
1− a as n→∞.
13The intuition is that a high search cost will make consumers willing to stop searching whenever
she finds a product with positive surplus, and so each firm acts as a monopoly.
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Proposition 3 After some firms are made prominent, all non-prominent firms will
raise their price (i.e., pB > p0), but prominent firms may raise or reduce their price.
In particular, pA > p0 if n ≥ 4, 2 ≤ m ≤ n − 1 and the search cost is relatively high
such that a is close to 1
2
; and pA < p0 if m = 1 or the search cost is suﬃciently low
such that a is close to one.
Non-prominent firms raise their prices because the presence of prominent firms
makes their demand include more returning demand proportionally. But how promi-
nent firms adjust their price seems more complicated. In general both pA < p0 and
pA > p0 are possible, but when the search cost tends to be extreme, the relationship
between pA and p0 is unambiguous. A little surprising result is that introducing more
than one prominent firm can lead all firms to raise their prices. As numerical simu-
lations show, this result can even take place under milder conditions (see a numerical
example presented in Figure 1 below).
4 The Impact of the Number of Prominent Firms
This section examines how the number of prominent firms aﬀects market prices and
welfare. A general comparative static analysis with respect to m is intractable, but we
can conduct it in the limit case when the search cost is close to zero (i.e., when a tends
to one).14
We first investigate how market prices vary with the number of prominent firms.15
Proposition 4 When the search cost is suﬃciently small, both pA and pB increase with
m at 1 ≤ m ≤ n− 2.
For intermediate a, numerical simulations suggest that pB still increases with m but
pA may not. The following graph presents an example of how prices vary with m when
a = 0.7 and n = 8. The horizontal dashed line is p0, the upper solid line is pB, and the
lower solid line is pA. We can see that pA changes with m non-monotonically.
14For fixed m, if we let n tend to infinity, then the situation is similar to the case with just one
prominent firm.
15When m = 0 or n, the market price should degenerate to p0. Hence, in general both market prices
pA and pB must vary with m non-monotonically. But our equilibrium conditions of pA and pB are
only valid for 1 ≤ m ≤ n− 1.
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Figure 1: An Example of Equilibrium Prices and m
We then investigate how welfare vary with the number of prominent firms. Total
output is
Qm = 1− pmApn−mB ,
and so industry profit is
Πm = pBQm −∆ ·mhApA,
where mhApA is the output supplied by all prominent firms. We subtract the second
term because prominent firms are charging a lower price than others. As we show in
Appendix A.7, total welfare is
Wm = a(1− an)− a(1− an−m) [am − (a−∆)m]
+m
Z a
a−∆
umdu+ n
Z a
pB
(u−∆)mun−mdu.
Consumer surplus is then Vm =Wm −Πm.
A simple observation is that making all firms prominent is the same as no prominent
firm at all, so all welfare variables must vary withm non-monotonically. We characterize
this non-monotonic relationship below when the search cost is suﬃciently small.
Proposition 5 When the search cost is suﬃciently small, total output decreases with
m first and then increases. In particular, it must decrease with m at 1 ≤ m ≤ n
2
and
increase with m at
√
2
1+
√
2
n < m ≤ n− 1.
The intuition of this result is as follows. First, as we have shown, when the search
cost is small, both pA and pB increase withm. Hence, largerm will reduce total output.
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Second, larger m shifts more consumers to prominent firms. Since prominent firms are
charging a lower price, the rise of m also has a positive eﬀect on total output. Our
non-monotonic result just reflects the combination of these two opposite eﬀects.
Proposition 6 When the search cost is suﬃciently small, industry profit increases with
m and total welfare and consumer surplus decrease with m if and only if total output
decreases with m.
Total welfare is mainly determined by total output and the price diﬀerence ∆. On
the one hand, since the production cost is zero, every consumer should be served.
Hence, higher total output means higher eﬃciency. On the other hand, consumers’
search behavior is socially eﬃcient when the market has a uniform price, but now
pA < pB makes too few consumers search beyond, and too many consumers return to,
the group of prominent firms. Thus, larger ∆ tends to result in less eﬃcient search
behavior. When the search cost is suﬃciently small, our results indicate that the search
eﬀect is negligible relative to the output eﬀect.
We present an example in the two graphs below where a = 0.7 and n = 8. The first
graph describes how industry profit (the lower curve) and consumer surplus (the upper
curve) vary with m, and the second graph describes how total welfare changes with m.
In eﬀect, further numerical simulations suggest that this kind of pattern is widespread.
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Figure 2: Industry Profit, Consumer Surplus, and m
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Figure 3: Total Welfare and m
A corollary of Propositions 5—6 is that, when the search cost is small, industrial
profit will reach its maximum and total welfare and consumer surplus will reach their
minimums when m is between n
2
and
√
2n
1+
√
2
≈ 0.586n. This result suggests that, if
there is a platform (for example, a search engine or a yellow page directory) through
which all firms sell their products, and if the platform can extract the whole (or a fixed
proportion of) industry profit, then it will make about half of firms prominent when
the search cost is small.16
5 Conclusion
This paper extends Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou (2007) to the case with multiple
prominent firms. Prominent firms still charge a lower price than their non-prominent
rivals as in the case with a single prominent firm, but relative to the situation without
prominence, the presence of more than one prominent firm can induce all firms to raise
their prices. We also show that, at least when the search cost is small, industry profit
first rises and then goes down with the number of prominent products, and it reaches
its maximum when about half of products become prominent; while consumer surplus
and total welfare vary in the opposite way.
Several issues related with prominence deserve future study. First, it may be de-
sirable to consider the impact of prominence on firms’ quality choices. In particular,
16Numerical simulations also suggest that the optimal number of prominent positions m∗ does not
vary by too much even if the search cost becomes higher. Of course, m∗ will become smaller if we
consider the cost of establishing prominent positions, and it might also be restricted by the available
space for prominent positions. In addition, the eﬀect of prominence on guiding consumers’ search may
also become weaker when more prominent positions are present, which will further reduce m∗.
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will prominent firms provide higher or lower quality products than their non-prominent
rivals? Second, it may also be interesting to consider the implications of prominence
when consumers need to search to find a satisfactory choice within a multi-product
seller (for example, a restaurant or a supermarket). Third, beyond the product market,
prominence may also play a significant role in the labor market. For example, some
employers are more “famous” than others and job seekers may apply for their vacancies
first; and some job candidates are more prominent than others and so they are more
likely to be considered first by employers. Hence, two-sided prominence can exist in a
search labor market.
A Appendix
A.1 Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
Existence: for expositional convenience, define
Ki ≡
1− ai
i (1− a) .
Rewrite the first-order condition (5) as pB = 1− a+ tB, where
tB ≡
rB
hB
=
1
Kn−m
Z a
pB
µ
u−∆
a−∆
¶m
un−m−1du.
tB is a decreasing function of pB on [0, a] since u−∆a−∆ decreases with pB when u < a. If
pB = 1−a, then condition (3) implies tB > 0 and so pB < 1−a+ tB. If pB = 1/2, then
pB > 1− a+ tB. This is because tB < a− pB by realizing Kn−m > an−m−1. Therefore,
for any fixed pA, on the range of [0, a] the first-order condition (5) has a unique solution
pB = bB(pA) ∈ (1− a, 1/2).
Rewrite the first-order condition (4) as pA = 1− a+ tA, where tA ≡ rˆA+rAhA . We first
show that, given pB ∈ [0, a], tA is a decreasing function of pA. Notice that
∂rA
∂pA
= (m− 1)
Z a
pB
(u−∆)m−2un−mdu
< an−m
£
(a−∆)m−1 − pm−1A
¤
,
and so
∂(rˆA + rA)
∂pA
< an−m
£
(a−∆)m−1 − pm−1A
¤
− (a−∆)m−1
= (an−m − 1)(a−∆)m−1 − an−mpm−1A < 0.
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Since the best response bB(pA) ∈ (1− a, 1/2), we can focus on pB ∈ (1− a, 1/2). Then,
if pA = 1 − a, we have pA < 1 − a + tA. This is because rA > 0 and 1 − pB < a also
implies rˆA =
R a
1−pB u
m−1du > 0. On the other hand, if pA = 1/2, then pA > 1− a+ tA
if tA < a− 1/2. We now show it is actually true. When pA = 1/2,
rA =
Z a
pB
(u− pB + 1/2)m−1un−mdu
<
an−m
m
[(a− pB + 1/2)m − 1/2m] ,
and
rˆA =
1
m
[am − (a− pB + 1/2)m] .
They imply
tA <
1
mhA
(am − 1/2m) = 1− a
1− am (a
m − 1/2m) < a− 1/2.
Therefore, for any pB ∈ (1−a, 1/2), (4) has a unique solution pA = bA(pB) ∈ (1−a, 1/2).
The continuity of bA(pB) and bB(pA) is no problem. Hence, the Brower fixed point
theorem implies that, on the area (0, a)2, the system of the first-order conditions has
at least one solution (pA, pB) ∈ (1− a, 1/2)2.
Uniqueness: we first show b0A(pB) ∈ (0, 1). Note that
b0A(pB) =
∂tA/∂pB
1− ∂tA/∂pA
,
where
∂tA
∂pA
=
1
Km
∙
(m− 1)
Z a
pB
(u−∆)m−2un−mdu− (a−∆)m−1
¸
and
∂tA
∂pB
=
1
Km
∙
(a−∆)m−1 − (m− 1)
Z a
pB
(u−∆)m−2un−mdu− pm−1A pn−mB
¸
.
It is clear that 1 − ∂tA∂pA >
∂tA
∂pB
. Moreover, ∂tA∂pB > 0 since the square-bracket term is
greater than
(a−∆)m−1 − an−m
£
(a−∆)m−1 − pm−1A
¤
− pm−1A pn−mB > 0
given pB < a. Hence, we have b0A(pB) ∈ (0, 1).
Substituting bA(pB) into the first-order condition (5), we obtain
pB = 1− a+
1
Kn−m
Z a
pB
µ
u− pB + bA(pB)
a− pB + bA(pB)
¶m
un−m−1du.
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b0A(pB) ∈ (0, 1) implies that bA(pB) − pB decreases with pB, and so the term in the
bracket is decreasing in pB. Therefore, the whole right-hand side of the above equation
is a decreasing function of pB and our solution is unique.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The rough idea of this proof is simple: we will show that, if consumers hold expectation
of pA > pB, then a prominent firm will have more fresh demand but less returning
demand than a non-prominent firm. Since returning demand is less price sensitive,
prominent firms tend to charge a lower price, which contradicts consumers’ expectation.
The proof consists of several steps:
Step 1: The stopping rule with pA > pB. If consumers expect pA > pB but their
search order is still restricted, then what is their optimal stopping rule? We keep the
notation ∆ = pB − pA. First of all, once a consumer enters B, her stopping rule is the
same as in the case with pA < pB. Now consider the situation before she enters B.
Denote by zk (k ≤ m) the reservation surplus level when she visits the kth firm in her
search process. That is, she will buy at the kth firm immediately if and only if this firm
provides surplus greater than zk. According to Kohn and Shavel (1974), these zk are well
defined and unique in our setup. We further claim that a−pA ≤ z1 ≤ · · · ≤ zm = a−pB.
Here zm = a − pB is easy to understand. Now consider a consumer who has visited
the (m− 1)th firm and been ensured a surplus vm−1. If vm−1 < a− pA, then searching
the last prominent firm is always desirable. If vm−1 ≥ zm = a − pB, then she should
stop searching now since a − pB > a − pA and she would never enter B. Therefore,
a− pA ≤ zm−1 ≤ zm.17 Similarly, we can prove a− pA ≤ zm−2 ≤ zm−1 and others. The
intuition is, when a consumer more approaches the end of pool A, she has more incentive
to search on in pursuit of the lower price in B. Let us summarize the consumer’s
stopping rule with expectation of pA > pB:
Among prominent firms, stop at the kth firm if and only if the highest available
surplus so far is no less than zk, where a − pA ≤ z1 ≤ · · · ≤ zm = a − pB;18 among
non-prominent firms, stop searching if and only if the highest available surplus is no
17More precisely, zm−1 can be defined as follows: let μ ≡ max(um − pA, zm−1) and G(μ) be its
distribution function. Then zm−1 =
R∞
zm
μdG(μ) +
R zm
−∞ VB(μ)dG(μ)− s, where VB(x) is the expected
surplus from entering B when the consumer has been ensured a surplus x. We can recursively define
other zi.
18The case with strictly increasing zi and z1 > a− pA can actually take place. For example, when
n = 3, m = 2, a = 0.6, pA = 0.45, and pB = 0.4, one can show that z1 ≈ 0.17 and z2 = 0.2.
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less than zB = a−pB; after searching all firms, return to the firm providing the highest
non-negative surplus (if any).
Step 2: The demand system. Since now there is no midway returning demand, each
firm’s demand consists of two parts: fresh demand and (final) returning demand. We
consider the returning demands rA and rB first. One can show that a firm’s returning
demand is independent of its actual price (for local deviation) and rA ≤ rB.19 The
intuition for rA ≤ rB is simple: when a consumer leaves a prominent firm and a
non-prominent firm, the former’s product on average has a lower net surplus since the
reservation surplus zi ≤ zm for i ≤ m, and so it wins the consumer back less likely.
Now we are ready to write down demand functions. For a prominent firm, if it
charges p while other firms stick to their equilibrium prices, its demand is
qA(p) =
1
m
mX
k=1
∙
(1− zk − p)
k−1Q
i=1
(zi + pA)
¸
+ rA.
Here
Qk−1
i=1 (zi + pA) /m is the probability that a consumer will visit this prominent firm
as the kth firm in her search process, and 1− zk − p is the conditional probability that
this consumer will buy immediately.20 For a non-prominent firm, if it charges p while
others keep charging their equilibrium prices, its demand is
qB(p) = (1− zB − p)Kn−m
mQ
k=1
(zk + pA) + rB.
Here Kn−m
Qm
k=1 (zk + pA) is the likelihood that a consumer will come to this non-
prominent firm as a fresh consumer.
Step 3: pA > pB is incompatible with equilibrium conditions. Define αk ≡
Qk−1
i=1 (zi + pA)
and notice αk ≥ αk+1. Then the first-order conditions are
1
m
mX
k=1
αk (1− zk − 2pA) + rA = 0, (8)
19One can check that
rA =
1
m
mX
k=1
Z pA+zk
pA
(u+∆)n−mum−k
k−1Q
i=1
min(zi + pA, u)du,
rB =
Z a
pB
un−m−1
mQ
i=1
min(zi + pA, u−∆)du.
The details for rA ≤ rB are available on request.
20More precisely, all zi + pA terms should be replaced by min(1, zi + pA) because of the boundary
problem. But this does not change our following analysis.
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and
Kn−mαm+1(1− a− pB) + rB = 0, (9)
where we have used zB = a− pB. Suppose pA > pB is the solution. Then we must have
pA > pB > 1− a, where the later inequality is from (9). Since zk ≥ a− pA, we have
1− zk − 2pA ≤ 1− a− pA < 0.
Then (8) implies
1
m
mP
k=1
αk (1− a− pA) + rA ≥ 0.
So
Kn−mαm+1 (1− a− pA) + rB > 0
since Kn−m < 1,
Pm
k=1 αk/m > αm+1, and rB ≥ rA. This, however, contradicts with
(9) when pA > pB. Therefore, consumers’ initial expectation of pA > pB cannot be
sustained in equilibrium.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
(i) Since ∆ > 0, the left-hand side of (6) is less than
1− am
1− a pB +
1− an−m
1− a a
mpB =
1− an
1− a pB,
while the right-hand side of (6) is greater than 1− pnB. Thus,
1− an
1− a >
1− pnB
pB
.
Comparing it to (7) yields p0 < pB.
(ii) When a→ 1
2
, we have ∆→ 0, and so
(a−∆)mpB ≈ (am −mam−1∆)(pA +∆) ≈ ampA + am−1(a−mpA)∆
and
pmAp
n−m
B = p
m
A (pA +∆)
n−m ≈ pnA + pn−1A (n−m)∆.
Substituting them into (6) yields
1− an
1− a pA − (1− p
n
A) ≈ ∆
∙
1− an−m
1− a a
m−1(mpA − a)− (n−m)pn−1A
¸
.
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When a→ 1
2
(and so pA → 12), the square-bracket term approaches to
m− 1
2m−1
− n− 1
2n−1
.
When 2 ≤ m ≤ n− 1 and n ≥ 4, this is positive and so
1− an
1− a >
1− pnA
pA
.
Comparing it to (7) yields pA > p0.
(iii) We first show that (a − ∆)mpB > ampA is a suﬃcient condition for pA < p0.
When this condition holds, the left-hand side of (6) is greater than 1−a
n
1−a pA. Meanwhile,
the right-hand side of (6) is less than 1− pnA since pA < pB. As a result,
1− an
1− a <
1− pnA
pA
,
and so pA < p0. When m = 1, the suﬃcient condition is equivalent to pB < a which
must be true. When a → 1, pB tends to the full-information equilibrium price p¯ =
(1− p¯n)/n < a/m. So when a→ 1, we have
1− ∆
pB
< 1− m∆
a
<
µ
1− ∆
a
¶m
,
which just implies the above suﬃcient condition.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
We first approximate equilibrium prices as the search cost is close to zero.
Claim 1 Define
ϕA ≡
(θ − p¯)m+ 1 + p¯n−1
2−mp¯+ θ , ϕB ≡
(θ − p¯)m
2−mp¯+ θ ,
where p¯ is the full-information equilibrium price satisfying np¯ = 1− p¯n and θ ≡ 1−p¯n−1n−1 .
When a is close to one, equilibrium prices can be approximated as
pi ≈ p¯+ kiε, i = A,B
where ε = 1− a and
ki =
p¯
2(1 + p¯n−1)
[n(1− ϕi) +m− 1] .
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Proof. When a = 1, equilibrium price is p¯. So we can approximate pi as p¯ + kiε as
a→ 1, where ε = 1−a and ki needs to be determined. Use Taylor expansion to extend
the first-order conditions (4)—(5) around a = 1 and discard all terms of higher than first
order. We get a system of equations about kA and kB. (The details of approximation
are available on request.) Then we can solve
(1 + p¯n−1)kA =
n+m− 1
2
p¯−
£
(θ − p¯)m+ 1 + p¯n−1
¤
k∆,
(1 + p¯n−1)kB =
n+m− 1
2
p¯− (θ − p¯)mk∆,
where
k∆ ≡ kB − kA =
np¯
2(2−mp¯+ θ) .
Using the notation we have introduced, we have
2(1 + p¯n−1)ki/p¯ = n(1− ϕi) +m− 1.
We now show equilibrium prices rise withm in this limit case. For pi to be increasing
with m, it suﬃces to show that ∂ϕi∂m <
1
n . Notice that
∂ϕB
∂m
<
∂ϕA
∂m
=
∂ϕB
∂m
+
p¯(1 + p¯n−1)
(θ + 2−mp¯)2
<
1
(θ + 1)2
£
(θ − p¯)(θ + 2) + p¯(1 + p¯n−1)
¤
(10)
since ∂ϕB∂m =
(θ−p¯)(θ+2)
(θ+2−mp¯)2 and θ + 2−mp¯ > θ + 1 (which is because mp¯ < np¯ = 1− p¯
n <
1). Using the definition of θ, one can show that (10) is less than 1n if and only if
(n + 1)p¯ + p¯n−1/n < 2. This must be true since p¯ < 1n . Therefore, both pA and pB
increase with m when the search cost is close to zero.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
When a → 1, using the approximated equilibrium prices, we can approximate total
output as
Qm ≈ 1− p¯n − (nkB −mk∆)p¯n−1ε.
So total output and nkB−mk∆ vary withm in the opposite direction. Using the results
in Claim 1, we have
nkB −mk∆ =
n(n+m− 1)p¯
2(1 + p¯n−1)
−
µ
n(θ − p¯)
1 + p¯n−1
+ 1
¶
mk∆,
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and so
∂
∂m
(nkB −mk∆) =
np¯
2(1 + p¯n−1)
−
µ
n(θ − p¯)
1 + p¯n−1
+ 1
¶
(θ + 2)np¯
2(θ + 2−mp¯)2 .
By using the definition of θ, a lengthy algebra manipulation shows that this expression
has the sign of
m2(n− 1)p¯+ (n− 2m)(2n− 1− p¯n−1). (11)
When 2m ≤ n, this is clearly positive, so total output decreases withm. When 2m > n,
the opposite result can happen. Using 2n − 1 − p¯n−1 > 2n(n − 1)p¯ (which is implied
by p¯ < 1/n and p¯n−1 < 1), a suﬃcient condition for (11) to be negative (and so total
output increases with m) is 2(n − m)2 < m2 or m >
√
2
1+
√
2
n. Also notice that (11)
decreases with m, and so total output rises with m first and then goes down.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6
When a→ 1, using the approximated equilibrium prices, we can approximate industry
profit as
Πm ≈ np¯2 + (nkB −mk∆) (p¯− p¯n)ε
and total welfare as
Wm ≈
n
n+ 1
(1− p¯n+1) + (mk∆ − nkB) p¯nε.
(The details of approximation are omitted since the procedure is standard.) We have
known that, as a → 1, ∂Qm∂m has the sign of
∂
∂m (mk∆ − nkB). Therefore, in this limit
case, how industry profit, consumer surplus, and total welfare vary with m is totally
determined by how total output varies with m.
A.7 Deriving total welfare
We derive the expression for total welfare for general distributions. Define two new
random variables:
vA ≡ max{u1, · · · , um}, v1 ≡ max{u1 +∆, · · · , um +∆, um+1, · · · , un}.
Their distribution functions are FA(u) = F (u)m and F1(u) = F (u − ∆)mF (u)n−m,
respectively. Let F ≡ F (a). Then we claim that total welfare is
Wm = [(1− Fm) + F (a−∆)m
¡
1− Fn−m
¢
]E(u|u ≥ a)
+
Z a
a−∆
udFA(u) +
∙Z a
pB
udF1(u)−∆mrA
¸
− sTm,
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where
Tm =
1
1− F
£
1− Fm + F (a−∆)m
¡
1− F n−m
¢¤
is a consumer’s expected number of searches.21
A consumer will end up as a fresh buyer in the prominent group with probability
1−Fm, and she will end up as fresh buyer in the non-prominent group with probability
F (a −∆)m (1− Fn−m). Hence, the first term reflects the expected gross surplus (ex-
cluding the search cost) from all fresh buyers. The second term is the expected gross
surplus from those midway returning consumers, and the third one is from those final
returning consumers. The reason why we subtract ∆mrA is that in the order statis-
tics v1, each prominent product’s utility is augmented by ∆. So when they win back
returning buyers (of which the probability is mrA), ∆ should be subtracted in surplus
calculation.
Using the fact that E(u|u ≥ a) − s
1−F = a (which is from the definition of a), one
can show
Wm = a[1− Fm + F (a−∆)m
¡
1− F n−m
¢
] +
Z a
a−∆
udFA(u)
+
Z a
pB
(u−∆)F (u)n−mdF (u−∆)m +
Z a
pB
uF (u−∆)mdF (u)n−m.
The expression in the uniform-distribution setting then follows immediately.
A.8 Equilibrium prices with general distributions
We aim to show that the result pA < pB holds for more general valuation distributions.
For expositional convenience, let φ(p, x) ≡ 1 − F (p + x) − pf(p + x). We keep the
following two assumptions:
Assumption 1 f(u) is logconcave, and a > 1−F (a)f(a) .
Assumption 2 φ2(p, x) ≤ 0 for positive p and x.
The second part of Assumption 1 requires a relatively small search cost, and it
corresponds to condition (3) in the main text. Assumption 2 is a reasonable restriction.
21In each step of the search process (no matter among the prominent firms or among the non-
prominent firms), a consumer has a probability of 1− F to be a fresh buyer. While the likelihood of
becoming a fresh buyer in the whole search process is the square-bracket term. Therefore, the expected
number of searches is Tm.
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It means that, if a monopoly firm supplies a product for which consumers’ valuation
distribution is F (u) and consumers’ reservation utility is x, then the optimal monopoly
price decreases with x since φ(p, x) is just the firm’s marginal profit at price p.
The first-order conditions are22
hAφ(pA, a− pA) + RˆA +RA = 0, (12)
and
hBφ(pB, a− pB) +RB = 0, (13)
where RˆA, RA, andRB are equilibriummarginal profits from a prominent firm’s midway
returning demand, its final returning demand, and a non-prominent firm’s returning
demand, respectively. Assumption 2 ensures that all these marginal profits are positive
(i.e., returning demand is less price “sensitive” than fresh demand in equilibrium).
Our demand functions are predicated on consumers’ expectation of pA < pB, and
we now confirm that this is indeed an equilibrium outcome.
Claim 2 Given Assumptions 1—2, if the system of the first-order conditions has solu-
tions, then one solution must specify pA < pB.23
Proof. Denote by ζ(pA, pB) the left-hand side of (12). As we will show below, if all
solutions to the system of (12)—(13) satisfied pA ≥ pB, then we would have ζ(pB, pB) <
0, and so the equation ζ(pA, pB) = 0 would have a solution pA < pB since ζ(0, pB) > 0
is always true. This is a contradiction.
We now show that ζ(pB, pB) < 0 if pA ≥ pB. Notice
ζ(pB, pB) = hAφ(pB, a− pB)−
Z a
pB
F (u)n−1φ2(pB, u− pB)du
= −hA
hB
RB −
Z a
pB
F (u)n−1φ2(pB, u− pB)du.
The second equality is because of (13). Since φ2(pB, u− pB) ≤ 0 for u ∈ [pB, a] due to
Assumption 2 and
RB = −
Z a
pB
F (u−∆)mF (u)n−m−1φ2(pB, u− pB)du,
22One can show that our profit functions are actually concave under Assumptions 1—2 if the support
of F (u) is unbounded. Hence, in that case the first-order conditions are also suﬃcient for equilibrium
prices.
23The technique used in the uniform setting relies on RˆA+RA−RB having the sign of 4, and does
not apply in this general setting.
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a suﬃcient condition for negative ζ(pB, pB) is F (u)n−1 < hAF (u−∆)mF (u)n−m−1/hB
for u ∈ [pB, a], or equivalently,
F (u)m
F (u−∆)m <
Km
Kn−mFm
Fm
F (a−∆)m ,
where F = F (a) and Ki = 1−F
i
i(1−F ) . Since Km > Kn−mF
m, it suﬃces to have
F (u)
F (u−∆) ≤
F (a)
F (a−∆) for u ∈ [pB, a]. (14)
Assumption 1 implies logconcave F (u) and so decreasing f(u)F (u) . If pA ≥ pB (and so
∆ ≤ 0), we have f(u)F (u) ≥
f(u−∆)
F (u−∆) , which implies that
F (u)
F (u−∆) is an increasing function
and so condition (14) holds.24
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